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Abstract
This study investigates when a cartel that uses a sales quota allocation scheme
monitors more frequently than it enforces; for example, monitoring of sales is done
on a weekly basis but firms are only required to comply with sales quotas on a
quarterly basis. In a simple three-period quantity game with iid cost and demand
shocks, we show that the volatility of a cartel member’s sales follows a U-shape
within the compliance horizon. In comparison, sales volatility is constant over time
under competition. This result oﬀers a simple empirical test for distinguishing
collusion from competition using sales data.
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Introduction

Many cartels, especially those in intermediate goods markets, do not just coordinate on
prices but also on an allocation of the market (Harrington, 2006). One method of market
allocation is sales quotas which can take the form of an absolute quantity or a market
share. An interesting feature of these quota-allocation schemes is that the timing of
monitoring and enforcement are not necessarily the same. Members of the lysine cartel,
for example, coordinated on sales quotas to be enforced on a quarterly basis although
they reported their sales on a monthly basis. As explained in Harrington and Skrzypacz
∗
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(2011), one of the member companies of the lysine cartel — Ajinomoto — was assigned the
task of preparing monthly "scorecards" for the cartel. Each member company telephoned
or mailed their monthly sales volumes to an executive of Ajinomoto, who then prepared a
spreadsheet that was distributed at the quarterly meetings of the cartel. And to enforce
compliance the cartel utilized a "guaranteed buy-ins" scheme: if during the quarter a
company sold more than its quota, it had to buy output from producers that were below
quota.
The citric acid cartel, which also operated during the 1990s, is another example.
In that cartel, monitoring of sales was done on a monthly frequency but enforcement
occurred only annually. Members coordinated on a sales quota scheme in terms of market
shares. On a monthly basis, each company reported its sales to an executive of Hoﬀmann
LaRoche. The data were then assembled and reported back to the members by telephone.
Enforcement was through a “buy-back system” whereby a company that exceeded its
assigned quota in any one year was obliged to purchase product from the companies with
sales below their quota in the following year.
It could be argued that a similar phenomenon may apply in an on-going antitrust
case in which three chicken producers have been accused of having coordinated on sales
quotas in Chile’s wholesale chicken market. The defense argues that these were not quota
allocations but rather sales projections provided by the trade association. (Without
taking a position here on what they were, for our current purposes we will refer to
them as quota allocations.) The companies were accused of restricting competition by
allocating weekly sales quotas of total kilos of chicken in its diﬀerent forms (legs, breast
and whole chicken). This claim was examined in Montero et al (2013) from which we
provide Figure 1 which compares companies’ actual weekly sales with their weekly "quota
allocations" for 2007 (figures for other years are quite similar). It is evident from Figure 1
that the companies systematically and significantly deviated from their allocations, both
individually and as a group. It is common to find weeks in which their sales were 10 or
20% above their "quotas" or 10 or 20% below, and this weekly "deviation" pattern is not
unique to the largest company but applies to all three firms.
From our knowledge of the operation of past cartels, however, one cannot rule out the
existence of a collusive sales quota agreement because there is a systematic and significant
discrepancy between actual weekly sales and purported weekly sales quotas. It is possible
that the compliance horizon is not weekly but of some longer length of time. In fact, in
its accusation and without being explicit about it, the National Prosecuting Authority
(FNE) appears open to the idea that the compliance horizon may have not been the
week but rather the calendar year based on its extensive discussion of how the companies
followed rather closely sales suggestions at the annual level (FNE, 2011, pp. 8-12). Figure
2 shows that "deviations" at the annual level were indeed far smaller, which may lead
2

Figure 1: Weekly "deviations" of chicken producers (reproduced from Figure 3.3 of Montero et al., 2013)
one to reasonably argue that the compliance horizon with the agreement was not the
week but the calendar year; that is, the arrangement was for firms to meet their sales
quotas at the annual level with monitoring done at the weekly level in order to provide
information to assist in making that happen. Of course, an alternative hypothesis is
that the lower deviation from sales projection at the annual level is the product of the
law of large numbers and not of collusion. If observed weekly sales equal weekly sales
projections plus iid noise then the variance of annual sales will necessarily be less than
the variance of weekly sales. Thus, competition could well produce this pattern. It is
then important to develop other tests that could distinguish collusion from competition
in the intertemporal pattern of sales, which is the contribution of this paper.
In this paper we exploit the diﬀerent timing between monitoring and compliance for
the purpose of deriving behavior that would allow one to empirically distinguish collusion
from competition. This investigation is conducted for a a simple linear quantity game
with iid cost and demand shocks. We find that early in the compliance horizon (which, as
described above, is conjectured to be annual for the purported chicken processing cartel),
the sales of a cartel member are more sensitive to contemporaneous shocks than are later
sales to contemporaneous shocks. The logic is that a cartel member will take greater
advantage of favorable shocks (that is, low cost or high demand) early in the compliance
horizon by producing above average, as it knows there will be ample time to oﬀset the
over-production with under-production in the remainder of the year and still hit the cumulative quota target established by the cartel. Based on this "adjustment-to-shocks"
3

Figure 2: Annual "deviations" of chicken producers (reproduced from Figure 3.4 of Montero et al., 2013)
eﬀect, the prediction is derived that, under collusion, the sensitivity of contemporaneous
sales to contemporaneous shocks should decline over the compliance horizon. In comparison, in our stationary environment, the sensitivity of sales to shocks is stationary over
time under competition.
There is a second eﬀect which we refer to as the "propagation-of-shocks" eﬀect. As
firms move through the compliance horizon, a cartel member’s residual or available quota
(that is, the quota less sales already realized) is more volatile as the result of previous shocks which adds to the volatility of sales. As the "adjustment-to-shocks" and
"propagation-of-shocks" eﬀects operate in diﬀerent directions, we find that the volatility
of sales of a cartel member follows a U-shape as opposed to the constant pattern under
competition. That the volatility of sales under collusion follows a distinct path from that
under competition could prove useful as a test for the presence of a cartel that engages
in sales quotas.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section
2 and firms’ equilibrium strategies are derived in Section 3. In Section 4, we derive the
equilibrium implications for the intertemporal pattern in the variance of sales and how it
can allow us to distinguish collusive from competitive behavior. We conclude in Section
5.
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2

Model

The model is designed to explore the implications for sales dynamics of a cartel that
implements sales quotas with a multi-period compliance horizon. The compliance horizon
is three periods in length which is suﬃcient to draw out the main insight. In this simple
model, we do not consider the collusive strategies deployed in the infinite horizon setting
but rather presume it involves sales quotas and just assume that firms are constrained
to satisfying the sales quota by the end of the compliance horizon.1 The environment is
enriched, however, by allowing for cost and demand shocks. After presenting the model,
we then solve for equilibrium strategies for firms over the compliance horizon. In the
following section, we explore the implications of equilibrium behavior for the cartel sales
path.
Consider an industry with two firms,  and , and a collusive agreement in which each
firm is allocated a total output quota of  =  =  every three periods. This is the same
as to say that firms receive a quota of 3 per period but compliance is only enforced at
the end of the third period. A firm is free to allocate its sales any way it wants over the
three periods as long as, at the end of period 3, its cumulative sales do not exceed . We
assume that the firms compete in the market by simultaneously choosing output  and
 in each period,  = 1 2 3. Sales are publicly observed. There is no discounting over
the three periods (which is unimportant for our results).
Firms face cost and demand shocks. Each firm has constant marginal cost where the
realized cost is iid across firms and time. Let  : [ ] → [0 ∞) be the continuous density
R
R
function on cost, and  ≡  () and  2 ≡  ( − )2 () denote the mean and
variance of cost, respectively. At the beginning of each period  and before choosing its
quantity  , firm  learns its current period cost,  , but does not observe the other firm’s
cost. As is standard in the Cournot model, the market clears according to the linear
inverse demand function  ( ) =  −  , where  =  +  is total output, and  is
a demand shock that is iid over time. Let  : [ ̄] → ( ∞) be its continuous density
R ̄
R ̄
function, and  ≡  () and  2 ≡  ( − )2 () denote the associated mean and
variance, respectively. Firms observe  before setting quantities for the period.
It is evident that in the absence of shocks (that is,  =  and  =  for sure and for
all ) it would be impossible for the analyst to separate competitive (Cournot) behavior
from collusive behavior by just looking at the evolution of sales. With either form of
conduct, production is constant over time. Our focus is on how cost and demand shocks
1

As described and analyzed in Harrington and Skrzypacz (2007, 2011), some cartels imposed a penalty
to exceeding the sales quota which is continuous in the discrepancy between sales and the quota. Thus,
firms could violate the quota without dire consequences. In the future, it is our intent explore the questions of this paper with such a specification but for this paper we implicitly assume that the consequences
of violating the sales quota are suﬃciently severe that firms ensure that the quota is satisifed.
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can allow us to separate collusive from competitive behavior using sales data.

3

Equilibrium Behavior

To facilitate the exposition, we consider first the case of cost shocks and then add demand
shocks.

3.1

Case of Cost Shocks

Assume for now that inverse demand is deterministic:  () =  − . Denote by
1 : [ ] → [0 ∞) a firm’s period 1 (symmetric) equilibrium strategy - which prescribes
a quantity given its period 1 cost - and by 2 : [ ] × [0 ]2 → [0 ∞) a firm’s period
2 (symmetric) equilibrium strategy - which prescribes a quantity given its period 2 cost
and the available quotas of both firms from period 1.2 Setting  suﬃciently small for
the problem to be non-trivial (that is, it is a binding constraint for colluding firms), a
firm’s period 3 strategy is simply to produce an amount equal to its available quota:
3 =  − 2 − 1 . To find equilibrium strategies 1 and 2 , we proceed by backward
induction.
Suppose we are in period 2 and the available quotas at the beginning of the period are

2 ≡  − 1 and 2 ≡  − 1 . Note that the available quotas are observed by both firms at
the beginning of each period which is the result of their quantities being observed. Firm
’s expected total payoﬀ as of period 2 (given its period 2 cost) is:
Z Z






£¡
¡
¢
¢
 − 2 − 2 2  2  2 − 2 2 +

¡ ¢
¡
¡
¢
¡
¡
¢¢
¢¡
¢¤
 −  2 − 2 −  2 − 2 2  2  2 − 3 2 − 2 (2 ) 3 2 3 

(1)

Note that the expectation is taken with respect to the other firm’s period 2 cost and
a firm’s own period 3 cost. (The other firm’s period 3 cost does not matter given the
assumption that firm  will produce 2 − 2 in period 3.) Note also that the equilibrium
¡
¢
strategy for the other firm, 2 2  2  2  depends not only on the firm’s own cost but
may also depend on the available quotas of both firms.
2
Conditioning on the available quotas is equivalent to conditioning on the period 1 quantities. In
principle, the period 2 strategy could also condition on a firm’s period 1 cost, but that will not be the
case in equilibrium.
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Recalling that  is the expected cost, (1) is equivalent to
Z





£¡
¡
¢
¢
 − 2 − 2 2  2  2 − 2 2 +

¡
¡
¢
¡
¡
¢¢
¢¡
¢¤ ¡ ¢
 −  2 − 2 −  2 − 2 2  2  2 −  2 − 2  2 2 

¡
¢
Take the first order condition (FOC), and solve for optimal 2 which is 2 2  2  2 :
¡
¢
2 2  2  2 =

where

µ

¶
£ ¡
¢¤
¤
1 £ 
22 + 2 − 2 2 2  2  2 +  − 2 
4

¢¤
£ ¡
 2 2  2  2 =

Z





(2)

¡
¢
2 2  2  2  (2 )2 

Taking the expectation of (2) and using the fact that 2 and 2 are independent:
Z µ

¶
¤ ¡ ¢
1 £ 
22 + 2 − 2[2 (2  ·)] +  − 2  2 2
4

µ ¶
£ ¡
¢¤
¤
1 £ 
 2 2  · =
22 + 2 − 2[2 (2  ·)] +  − 
4
µ ¶
£ ¡  ¢¤
¤
1 £ 
 2 2  · =
22 + 2 − 2[2 (2  ·)]
4

¢¤
£ ¡
 2 2  ·) =

(3)

Similarly, we have
¢¤
£ ¡
 2 2  · =

µ

¶
¤
1 £ 
22 + 2 − 2[2 (2  ·)]
4

We have two equations, (2) and (3), and two unknowns. Solving we obtain
£ ¡
¢¤ 

 2 2  · = 2  [2 (2  ·)] = 2
2
2

and using these values in (2) leads to

¡
¢ 
 − 2

2 2  2  2 = 2 +
2
4

(4)

On average, a firm produces half of its available quota in period 2, leaving the other half
for period 3. When its period 2 cost is favorable (in the sense that it is below the mean
value for cost) then it produces above the level of 2 2 in order to take advantage of the
low cost realization. If instead the cost realization is unfavorable then produces below
2 2 in order to save more quota for period 3 when, on average, the cost realization will
7

be better than that for period 2.3
Recall that (4) was derived under the conjecture that a firm would want to produce
at its remaining quota 2 − 2 in period 3. We then need to verify that is indeed optimal
for a firm given its period 2 equilibrium quantity and do so for all cost realizations in
periods 2 and 3 and for all available period 2 quotas. For that we just need to check what
happens when firms’ available quotas are at their maximum values in period 3, which
occurs, in equilibrium, when both firms had the highest cost of  in periods 1 and 2. In
that case, the myopic (unconstrained) best reply in period 3 exceeds the available quota
if and only if:
−
−
2

µ ¶
1
[ − 1 () − 2 (  − 1 ())]   − 1 () − 2 (  − 1 ())
2

(5)

We cannot proceed any further with the verification of this conjecture without first
deriving the period 1 equilibrium strategy 1 , which we do next.
Given 2 and 2 , deriving period 1 equilibrium strategies requires that we first compute
firms’ payoﬀs in period 2 onwards as a function of the unused allocations coming out of
period 1. Denote these payoﬀs by 2 (2  2 ) and 2 (2  2 ). Thus, firm ’s expected
payoﬀ in period 2 (given the available quotas) is:
[2 (2  2 )]

=

Z Z






£¡
¢
 − 2 (2  ·) − 2 (2  ·) − 2 2 (2  ·)+

¢
¡
¢
¢¡
¢¤ ¡ ¢
¡
¡
 −  2 − 2 (2  ·) −  2 − 2 (2  ·) −  2 − 2 (2  ·)  2  (2 )2 2 

It takes a bit of algebra to show that

¸
Z Z ∙
¡ ¢
1
1 
5  1 

 −  − 2 − 2 − 2 − 2  2  (2 )2 2
2
12
12
2


1
=  − [2 ] − 2 − 
2


[2 (2  2 )] =

2

Now, firm ’s expected total payoﬀ as of period 1 (given its period 1 cost) is:
Z





£¡
¢ ¤
 − 1 − 1 (1 ) − 1 1 (1 )1 + [2 (2  2 )]

where recall 2 ≡  − 1 and 2 ≡  − 1 . Firm ’s problem is to choose 1 , given the cost
3
Note that the equilibrium strategy (4) is independent of the rival’s available quota which is probably
due to the linearity of the problem (that is, linear demand and cost functions), and thus need not hold
more generally.
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realization 1 . The FOC for this problem is
1
 − 21 − [1 (1 )] − 1 =  − ( − [1 (1 )]) − ( − 1 ) − 
2
which, after rearranging, leads to the optimal period 1 quantity 1 (1 ) :
1 (1 ) =

¢
1 ¡
3 − 3[1 (1 )] + 2 − 21 
6

Proceeding as we did in solving for the period 2 equilibrium strategy, we have
[1 (1 )] =

¢
1 ¡
3 − 3[1 (1 )] 
6

and, using the symmetry of the problem, we get


[1 (1 )] = [1 (1 )] = [1 (1 )] = 
3
Therefore,
  − 1
+
(6)
3
3
Similar to the period 2 case, a firm produces above (below) the per period quota of 3
when its cost realization is below (above) average.
In comparing the period 1 and period 2 equilibrium strategies in (4) and (6), respectively, we find that the period 1 quantity is more sensitive to the period 1 shock than
the period 2 quantity is to the period 2 shock, which in turn are more sensitive than the
period 3 quantity to the period 3 shock (which, by the assumption that the quotas are
binding with probability one, is not sensitive at all to period 3 cost):
1 (1 ) =

1
1

1

= −  − = 2  0 = 3 

1
3
4
2
3
Property 1: A firm’s quantity is more sensitive to the contemporaneous cost shock
when it is earlier in the compliance horizon.
A firm’s quota for the compliance horizon is a scarce resource and when it produces above
its quota in a given period there is less quota available for later production. Given that
cost is stochastic, a firm wants to save up its quota so that it can produce more when its
cost is low. If a firm produces more in period 2 in order to take advantage of low period 2
cost, there is necessarily less output that can be produced in period 3 which means a firm
could not take advantage of a low period 3 cost realization. In comparison, in period 1, a
firm does not have to be as frugal when it comes to using up its quota because there are
two periods with which to adjust its quantity in order to comply with the quota. Thus,
9

even if firm 1 produces at a high level in period 1 because of a low period 1 cost, it will
still be in a position to produce at a high level in period 2 if there is a low period 2 cost.
In sum, early in the compliance horizon, quantities are more sensitive to cost shocks as
a firm can depart from "average quantity" knowing it’ll have more periods to adjust its
quantity and still hit the cumulative quantity target. As a firm gets near the end of the
compliance horizon, its quantity becomes less sensitive to contemporaneous cost shocks
and more sensitive to the available quota as it has a shorter time to manage its quantities
in order to ensure that its sales do not exceed the its sales quota.
Notice, however, that equilibrium quantities are more sensitive to cost shocks in period
1 than in period 2 does not necessarily imply that the sales path of a cartel firm is more
volatile at the beginning of the compliance window than at the end. There is a second
force that operates in the opposite direction: the quantity in period 2 is not only subject
to period 2 cost shocks but also to period 1 cost shocks which operate indirectly through
the available quota (i.e., 2 ). In the next section, we study how the combination of these
two forces determines the evolution of sales volatility.
Before closing the section, we return to the verification we initiated in equation (5),
which can be rewritten as
µ ¶
−
3

( − 1 () − 2 (  − 1 ()))
2
2
∙
µ
¶ µ
¶¸
−
 −
 −
 −
+
+
−
3
3
3
3
12
 −   5( − )
 −   5( − )
 +
⇒
− 
(7)
3
3
12
3
3
12
Recall that we want to ensure that firm  finds it optimal to produce in period 3 so
that its sales quota is binding; that is, it produces 2 − 2 for any cost realizations for
both firms in periods 1 and 2 and for any cost realization for this firm in period 3. Let
us assume the per period collusive allocation 3 is less than the average static Nash
equilibrium quantity,
−

 
3
3
so that, on average, the sales quota is less than the competitive supply. In that case,
(7) holds as  →  Hence, if the support on cost is not too large then (7) holds, and
the equilibrium strategies found above, (4) and (6), are valid for any cost realizations in
[ ].

10

3.2

Case of Cost and Demand Shocks

It is straightforward to add iid demand shocks to the model.4 As before, equilibrium
strategies are found by backward induction. Suppose we are in period 2 and 2 ≡  − 1
and 2 ≡  − 1 . Then a firm’s payoﬀ as of period 2 is
Z



̄

Z Z






¢
£¡
¡
¢
2 − 2 − 2 2  2  · − 2 2 +

¡
¢¢
¡ ¢
¡
¢
¡
¡
¢¡
¢¤
3 −  2 − 2 −  2 − 2 2  3  · − 3 2 − 2 (2 ) 3  (3 ) 2 3 3 

Proceeding as before to derive the optimal 2 , we obtain the equilibrium strategy
2 (2  2  2  2 ) =

2 2 −   − 2
+
+
2
6
4

(8)

R ̄
where recall  =   () .
We next turn to period 1 quantities given the derived equilibrium quantity rules for
period 2. Firm i’s expected total payoﬀ as of period 1 (given period 1 demand and cost)
is:
Z 
£¡
¢ ¤
1 − 1 − 1 (1  1  ·) − 1 1 (1 )1 + [2 (2  2 )]


where [2 (2  2 )] is the expected equilibrium payoﬀ in the continuation game with
available quotas 2 and 2 and it is equal to
Z

Z

¡
¢
£
(2 − 2 − 2 − 2 )2 + (3 −  2 − 2 −
¡
¢¤ ¡ ¢
(2 − 2 ) − ) 2 − 2  2 (2 )(3 )(2 )2 2 3 2


where 2 ≡ 2 (2  2  2  2 ).
Proceeding as in Section 3, it is not diﬃcult to show that the period 1 equilibrium
strategy is
 2(1 − )  − 1
1 (1  1 ) = +
+

(9)
3
9
3
Since 29  16, we find a similar relationship to that in Section 3.1 in that period 1
quantities are more sensitive to period 1 demand shocks than period 2 quantities are to
period 2 demand shocks, which in turn are more sensitive than period 3 quantities to
period 3 demand shocks. In fact, the equilibrium strategy for any period  = 1 2 3 can
4

Given that demand shocks are market-wide, we also expect the same implications to emerge from a
common cost shock to firms as would occur, for example, from a common change in an input price.
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be written more generally as
 (     )


+ 
=
 −+1

µ

¶
2
1

( − ) + ( −  )
9
3

(10)

where  = 3 is the number of periods within the compliance window, 1 = 1, 2 = 34
and 3 = 0. Note how the "adjustment" coeﬃcients  ’s go down overtime. Furthermore,
from looking at the regularity in (10), it should be possible to find the equilibrium
strategies for any  recursively (something we don’t do here).
Property 2: A firm’s quantity is more sensitive to the contemporaneous demand shock
when it is earlier in the compliance horizon.

4

Volatility of Sales

The volatility of period 1 sales depends only on the volatility of period 1 shocks. From
the equilibrium strategy (9), we obtain that the variance of period 1 sales is
Var[1 ]

1
= 2
9

µ

4 2
 +  2
9 

¶

(11)

where  2 and  2 are the variances of demand and cost shocks, respectively. Furthermore,
given perfect compliance with the cartel agreement (that is, 3 =  − 1 − 2 ), it is
evident that period 3 sales are more volatile than sales in any previous period. In fact,
the unconditional variance of period 3 sales is simply
Var[3 ] = Var[1 ] + Var[2 ]
Much less evident is how the volatility of period 2 sales compares to the volatility of
period 1 sales because of the operation of the two eﬀects identified earlier. Equilibrium
strategies show that firms adjust less to contemporaneous shocks as we move towards
the end of the compliance window - this is the adjustment-to-shocks eﬀect - but at the
same time these later sales are not only subject to contemporaneous shocks but also to
previous shocks through changes in the available quota left to cover future sales - this
is the propagation-of-shocks eﬀect. Using the equilibrium strategy (8) and the fact that
2 =  − 1 (1  1 ) along the equilibrium path, the unconditional variance of period 2
sales is
µ
¶
1
1
4 2


2
Var[2 ] = Var[1 ] +
 +  
4
162 9 
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Using (11), we have
Var[2 ] =
In sum,

µ

13
Var[1 ]
16

¶
µ
¶
13
29





Var[1 ] = Var[2 ]  Var[1 ]  Var[3 ] = Var[1 ]
16
16

There is then the implication that period 2 sales are less volatile than both period
1 and period 3 sales. This lower volatility is the result of the adjustment-to-shocks
eﬀect dominating the propagation-of-shocks eﬀect. Thus, early in the horizon, one would
expect a high adjustment eﬀect to dominate a low propagation eﬀect in that sales would
be mostly sensitive to contemporaneous cost shocks. As the firm moves forward, its sales
becomes less sensitive to contemporaneous cost shocks and more sensitive to previous
shocks as reflected in the remaining quota. In the intermediate time period, a lower
adjustment eﬀect dominates a higher propagation eﬀect which results in overall less
volatility. When the firm gets near the end of the compliance horizon, there is virtually
no room for adjustment to contemporaneous shocks; its sales are nevertheless highly
volatile because of the propagation eﬀect. This implies that the volatility of sales of
a cartel member follows a U-shape as opposed to the volatility of a firm’s sales in the
absence of collusion which exhibit a stable path.
Property 3: Sales volatility is minimized in the middle of the compliance horizon.
That the volatility of sales under collusion follows a distinct path from that under
competition is a useful finding that has a simple intuition and a clean prediction that one
can take to sales data. For example, if a fraction of firms of an industry are suspected of
forming a cartel one can use this theory to test for diﬀerences between the volatility of
sales of those firms suspected of being part of the cartel and those that are not. Provided
that one can get access to monthly series of sales data of both cartel and non-cartel firms,
the citric acid cartel is a potentially good example to run such a test as it comprised the
five largest producers which together controlled about 60 percent of global production
and 67 percent of production in the European Union (Harrington, 2006).
In applying our theory to less than all inclusive cartels, however, it is important to
keep in mind that the volatility of sales of a non-cartel firm is also aﬀected by the way
cartel firms price their products and adjust their quantities to shocks.5 This interaction
makes for an interesting extension to our theory; but one that should not undermine the
main result that collusive and competitive behavior can be distinguished by looking at
5

In a model in which monitoring and enforcement follow the same timing, Montero and Guzman
(2010) study how a cartel that faces a fringe of competitive suppliers adjust its overall quota to changes
in demand.
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the volatility of sales. Take for example a positive demand shock early on the compliance
horizon. Cartel members would increase their production to take advantage of the favorable shock while non-cartel firms would not react as much to the positive shock because
of the strategic sustitutability of quantities. This would make cartel sales look even more
volatile relative to those of non-cartel firms. This is just one example illustrating why
our theory should still apply in the case of a "partial" cartel, but obviously a more formal
extension is required before any conclusions are drawn.
In the case of an all-inclusive cartel, which probably better applies to the case of
the allegedly chicken cartel mentioned in the Introduction and which controlled about
90% of domestic production (Montero et al., 2013), the test may require a time series of
sales data long enough to cover periods where the cartel was not in operation. This data
may correspond to the period before the cartel was formed or after the accusation was
initiated (though provided the cartel would no longer be able to maintain cooperation).
In the absence of such "counterfactual" sales data, one can still run the test if shocks are
expected to follow a pattern that can be explained by other observables (e.g., prices of
relevant inputs and prices of other meat products).

5

Conclusions

In a simple model, we have explored collusive behavior in the context of a sales quota
scheme when monitoring occurs at a higher frequency than is enforcement imposed for
non-compliance. There are two main contributions. The first contribution is identifying
two dynamic forces at work with regards to a firm’s quantity. The adjustment-to-shocks
eﬀect is that a cartel member’s quantity is less responsive to contemporaneous cost and
demand shocks as we move towards the end of the compliance (or enforcement) horizon.
Early on in the compliance horizon, a firm takes greater advantage of low cost shocks by
producing at a higher rate, knowing that it has more periods to adjust its sales in order
to ensure compliance by the end of the compliance horizon. The propagation-of-shocks
eﬀect is that, as a cartel member moves towards the end of the compliance horizon, its
available quota is more volatile as it is the cumulative product of more cost and demand
shocks. While the adjustment-to-shocks eﬀect results in greater sales volatility earlier in
the compliance horizon, the propagation-of-shocks eﬀect results in greater sales volatility
later in the compliance horizon. The second contribution is showing that, when both of
these eﬀects are taken account of, sales volatility is initially decreasing as a cartel member
moves through the compliance horizon and is then increasing so that sales volatility is
minimized at an intermediate stage of the compliance horizon. This finding provides a
test for a cartel with a sales quota scheme since, under competition, sales volatility is
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stationary and thus does not exhibit this intertemporal pattern.
Under standard models of competition, if cost and demand are stationary stochastic
processes then firms’ quantities are stationary stochastic processes, too. However, when
firms collude using sales quotas and the timing of monitoring and compliance do not coincide then firms’ quantities are no longer stationary. The distribution on firms’ quantities
will depend on where they are in the compliance window. It was this non-stationarity
property that was exploited in deriving the collusive markers for distinguishing collusion
from competition. While our analysis assumed iid processes for cost and demand shocks,
the general approach can be used to derive collusive markers as long as the cost and demand processes are stationary. Thus, the analysis could be extended in a straightforward
way to allow cost and demand shocks to be serially correlated.
The model used for this analysis assumes a three-period compliance horizon and that
firms produce subject to the constraint of satisfying the three-period sales quota. While
useful for gaining some initial insight into how a sales quota scheme with an enforcement
horizon exceeding the monitoring horizon impacts sales dynamics, a proper approach
would set the problem up in an infinite horizon setting, endogenize the penalty from
exceeding the sales quota (rather than presuming it is so severe that a firm would never
exceed it), and derive equilibrium behavior given that penalty function. Of particular
interest is to use that structure to solve for the optimal frequency of monitoring and
enforcement. Understanding how market conditions - such as the number of firms and
cost and demand volatility - impact the length of the enforcement horizon could deliver
additional properties on collusive behavior and thus allow for a richer set of tests for
assessing whether a cartel is present in a market.
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